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Summary findings
Kaminsky,  Lyons,  and Schmukler  address  the trading  Lagged  momentum  trading (buying  past winners  and
strategies  of mutual  funds in emerging  markets.  The data  selling  past losers)  is stronger  during noncrises,  and
set they develop  permits  analyses  of these  strategies  at  stronger  for fund managers.
the level  of individual  portfolios.  Investors  also  engage  in contagion  trading-selling
A methodologically  novel feature  of their analysis:  assets  from one country  when asset prices  fall in another.
they disentangle  the behavior  of fund managers  from that  These findings  are based on data about mutual  funds
of investors.  that represent  only 10 percent of the market
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winners  and sell losers.  sell when they buy)  would be difficult-and the premise
Contemporaneous  momentum  trading (buying  current  that funds respond  to contemporaneous  returns rather
winners  and selling  current losers)  is stronger  during  than causing  them would become  tenuous.
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L Introduction
Financial  crisis in 1997  engulfed  not only Asia, it spread to countries  as distant as
South Africa, the Czech Republic, and Brazil. To  understand why, a  literature has
developed  that examines  why the spreading  of crisis might  be due to financial  links. There
is evidence  that banks, for example,  were important in spreading  the 1997 crisis. The
transmission  channel was lending:  countries  were exposed  to the same banks (Kaminsky
and  Reinhart  1999). Portfolio investors have  also  been  scrutinized, particularly
institutions,  such as hedge funds, pension funds, and mutual funds (Brown et al. 1998,
Eichengreen  and Mathieson  1998,  Kim and Wei 1999,  Frankel  and Schmukler  1998,  among
many others). A common conclusion  is that institutions sometimes  panic, disregarding
fundamentals,  and spreading crisis even to  countries with strong fundamentals.  The
literature  notes that individuals,  too, can contribute  to this panic by fleeing from funds-
particularly  mutual funds-forcing fund  managers  to sell  when fundamentals  do not warrant
selling.
This paper contributes  to this literature  on financial  links by examining  the trading
strategies  of an important  class of investor:  U.S. mutual funds. Surprisingly,  systematic
analysis  of mutual funds' international  strategies does not yet exist.' Consequently,  our
results are of more general  interest than our crisis motivation  might suggest.  At the same
time, the lack of systematic analysis of funds' behavior during crises warrants special
attention.  Though there is some evidence  that funds  help crisis to spread, that evidence  is
indirect  and highly aggregative.  Frankel and Schmukler  (1998), for example,  use closed-
end mutual funds to show that the Mexican crisis in 1994 was not transmitted  to Asia
directly,  but indirectly,  via New York,  where the funds are traded. The opposite  view-
that funds do not spread crisis-also has some support  in aggregate  data. For example,  net
IFunds'  domestic (U.S.) strategies  have been analyzed  extensively,  however. See Grinblatt et al. (1995),
Warther  (1995), and Wermers (1999), among others.
1redemption  by mutual-fund  investors during crisis periods is not large, and outflows  that
occur tend to be small and short-lived  (at least during Mexico's crisis-see  Marcis et al.
1995 and Rea 1996). Froot et al. (1998) present a similar picture based on aggregated
flows that mix mutual funds with other types of international  investor.  They find that net
inflows  during the Mexican  and Asian crises decreased,  but there is little evidence  of net
outflows.
2
Our paper departs  from  the more aggregated  analysis  above  by effecting  analysis  at
the portfolio level. We develop  a novel data set that includes individual  portfolios,  which
allows us to examine trading strategies at much higher resolution.  The data include the
quarterly  holdings of 13 mutual funds from April 1993  to January 1999.  All 13 funds are
dedicated  Latin America  funds. (At year-end 1998,  there were 25 Latin America  funds;  the
13 we track account  for 88% of the value of these 25 funds.)  We use these data to address
two sets of questions.  The first set relates  to whether  funds  engage  in momentum  trading-
systematically  buying winning stocks and selling losing stocks (Jegadeesh  and Titman
1993,  Grinblatt  et al. 1995).  The second  set of questions  relates  to whether  funds  engage  in
contagion  trading,  by which  we mean systematically  selling  stocks from one country  when
stock prices are falling in another.  In addressing  this second set of questions,  we establish
a first, direct  empirical  link between  contagion  and trading  strategies.
The methodological  contribution  of the paper is our approach  to attributing  actions
to fund managers  versus underlying  investors.  Despite  a vast literature  on the behavior  of
domestic (i.e., U.S.) funds, to our knowledge  we are the first to disentangle  the two. In
effect, the trades of mutual funds reflect both institutional  and individual  decisions.  To
understand  those trades,  particularly  in the intemational  context,  ensuring  that the decisions
are  not commingled  is an important  step.
Our results show that emerging-market  funds do indeed engage in momentum
trading.  Their strategies  exhibit  positive  momentum-they systematically  buy winners  and
sell losers. This is due to momentum  trading at both the fund-manager  level and the
investor  level  (through  redemptions/inflows). We  further  distinguish  between
2 Though a lovely data set, the Froot el al. (1998) data do not include transactions settled in foreign
currencies,  e.g., ADR trades in New York and Brady bonds. These trades can be especially important in
times of crisis when local-market  liquidity is at a minimum. Our fund-portfolio  data include these trades.
2contemporaneous  momentum  trading (buying current  winners and selling current losers)
and  lagged  momentum trading  (buying  past  winners  and  selling  past  losers).
Contemporaneous  momentum trading is  stronger during crises, and stronger for fund
investors  than for fund managers.  Lagged  momentum  trading,  on the other  hand, is stronger
during non-crisis  periods, and stronger for managers. We also find that funds engage in
contagion  trading,  by which we mean that they systematically  sell assets  from one country
when asset prices fall in another. This contagion  trading is due primarily  to underlying
investors,  not managers.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines our approach to
measuring  momentum  trading  and contagion  trading.  Section  III describes  our data. Section
IV presents our momentum and contagion results. Section V addresses whether return
autocorrelation  within Latin America can rationalize our section-IV  results. Section VI
concludes.  The appendix  provides  some related  regression-based  analysis.
H. Strategies:  Momentum  Trading  and Contagion  Trading
This section  presents  our approach  to testing  whether  funds  employ  momentum  and
contagion  trading  strategies.  Momentum  trading-also  called  positive  feedback  trading-is
the systematic  purchase  of stocks that have performed  well, and sale of stocks that have
performed  poorly ("winners"  and "losers").  Contagion  trading  is the selling  of assets  from
one country  when asset prices are falling in another. Contagion  trading is thus a cross-
country phenomenon, in  contrast to  momentum trading, which  is  a  within-country
phenomenon.  (This type of cross-country  analysis is not possible using recent single-
country  data  sets, such as those of Kim and Wei 1999  and Choe,  Kho,  and Stulz 1999.)
First, we review  the existing  finance literature on momentum  trading. Second,  we
present  our approach  to testing for momentum  trading, an approach  that draws from this
earlier  literature.  Then we turn to contagion  trading, presenting  first a brief review of the
"contagion"  literature, followed by our approach to testing for contagion trading. The
approach  we adopt in testing for contagion  trading is in the same spirit as our test for
momentum  trading.
311.1.  Introduction  to Momentum  Trading
The literature  on momentum  trading includes  two lines of work, one based in asset
pricing and the other based in international  finance.  The asset-pricing  line begins with the
finding  that a strategy of buying past winners and selling past losers generates  significant
positive  returns over 3- to 12-month  holding  periods (Jegadeesh  and Titman 1993,  Asness
et al. 1997, Rouwenhorst  1998).3  Once established,  this result inspired  work on whether
investors  actually  follow  momentum  trading  strategies.  Grinblatt  et al. (1995),  for example,
examine  the domestic  strategies  of U.S. mutual funds  and find that they do systematically
buy past winners.  They do not systematically  sell past losers,  however.  They also find that
funds using momentum trading  strategies realize significantly better  performance.
Evaluation  of performance  is a central  theme for all the papers in this asset-pricing  line of
the literature.
The second line of work on momentum  trading  is based in international  finance.  Its
organizing  theme is the link between  returns and intemational  capital flows.  At the center
of this literature  is the positive contemporaneous  correlation  between capital inflows  and
returns. Early work establishes  this correlation  using data aggregated  over both time and
types of market participant (Tesar and Werner 1994,  Bohn and Tesar 1996).  Later work
relaxes the aggregation  over time to address  whether the contemporaneous  correlation  in
quarterly  data is truly contemporaneous  (Froot et al. 1998,  Choe et al. 1999,  Kim and Wei
1999). Higher frequency data can distinguish  three possibilities.  Returns may precede
flows, indicating  positive feedback trading (which is not necessarily irrational, per the
asset-pricing  literature noted above). Returns and flows may be truly contemporaneous,
indicating that order flow itself may be driving prices. 4 And returns may lag flows,
3
The return "continuations"  that are implied  by this result are not inconsistent  with the return "reversals"
documented elsewhere in the literature. Horizon length is the key to understanding this: continuations
appear at mid-range  horizons, 3 to 12  months. Return  reversals, in contrast, appear  at short horizons (up to
I month, see Jegadeesh 1990 and Lehmann 1990) and at long horizons (3 to 5 years, see De Bondt and
Thaler 1985).  Reversals  call for "contrarian"  (or negative feedback) trading strategies.  Parenthetically,  all
these timne-series  anomalies are distinct from the  cross-sectional anomalies that have received much
attention in the asset-pricing  literature recently (e.g., size and book-to-market  effects).
4Microstructure  finance provides three channels for truly contemporaneous  price impact. The first is
information-if  the buyer has superior  information about a security's payoffs, then the purchase signals
that information, shifting expectations, and thereby increasing price. The second is incomplete  risk-
sharing at the marketmaker  level-the  buyer's purchase temporarily  disturbs  the marketmaker's position,
4indicating  flows' ability to predict returns. Using high-frequency  data aggregated  across
types of market participant,  Froot et al. (1998) find evidence  of all three, with the first-
positive feedback  trading-being the most important  for explaining  quarterly  correlation.
Choe et al. (1999) and Kim and Wei (1999) use high-frequency  data from Korea to
examine  positive feedback trading around the 1997 currency  crisis. Choe et al. find that
foreign investors as a group engage in positive feedback trading before the crisis, but
during the crisis feedback trading mostly disappears.  Kim and Wei examine foreign
institutional  investors separately  and find that they engage in positive feedback  trading at
all times-before, during, and after the crisis.
Our analysis is related to, and borrows from, both the intemational-finance  and
asset-pricing  lines of the literature.  Like the work in international  finance, we are more
concerned  about international  flows and crisis transmission  than portfolio performance.
Like work in asset pricing,  however,  we maintain a direct link to investment  strategy and
its measurement.  In particular, we focus on a specific class of international  investor-
mutual funds.  A benefit of focusing  on a specific  investor  class is that we can characterize
the evolution of actual portfolios, and how that evolution relates to returns in various
countries.  Another  benefit is that our data allow  us to analyze  jointly the behavior  of fund
managers  and their underlying  investors.  On the cost side, focusing  on funds as a specific
investor class means that we lose resolution in terms of data frequency: our data are
quarterly.
which requires the  buyer to pay  compensation in the  form of  a higher price  (so-called "inventory
effects").  The  third  is imperfect  substitutability-the  buyer's  purchase  may  be a large  enough  portfolio
shift  relative  to the  market  as  a whole  that  permanently  higher  price  is required  to clear  the  market  (even
if  it is common knowledge that the buyer does not have superior information about the security's
payoffs).
511.2.  Measuring  Momentum  Trading
Our momentum-trading  measure is akin to that used to analyze funds' domestic
strategies  (e.g., Grinblatt  et al. 1995).  The measure captures  the relation  between security
transactions  and returns.  It is based on the  mean of individual  observations  of the variable: 5
ij,y  =  Q  t  (1)
where Qi,j, tis the holding  by fund i of stock  j (in shares)  at time t,  Qij  t  is  (QiJ,t+Qii,t  )/2,
and Rj,tk  is the return on stock j  from t-k-l to t-k. When k-0, this measure captures the
contemporaneous  relation between  trades and returns-referred to as lag-zero  momentum
trading (LOM).  When  k=l, the measure  captures  the lagged  response of trades to returns,
and is referred to  as  lag-one momentum trading (L1M). Parenthetically,  notice the
implication  of the  j subscript:  the mean of  ,, measures  the intensity  of momentum  trading
at the level of individual  stocks. Testing the null of no momentum  trading is a test of
whether  the mean of Kj,, over all i,  j, and t is zero.
This measure of momentum  trading  has two important  advantages.  First, it is not
contaminated  by "passive  price momentum."  Passive  price momentum  arises in momentum
trading  measures-like those of Grinblatt  et al.-where  the term in brackets  is a change in
portfolio weight, rather than a percentage quantity adjustment.  When using a portfolio
weight, a price increase in one stock (relative to prices of other holdings) produces a
positive  relation  between  weights and returns  that has nothing to do with trading strategy.
(A similar  positive  relation  arises for losing stocks.)  The second advantage  of our measure
over one based on portfolio weights is that our measure is not contaminated  by another
passive effect-  "passive  quantity  momentum."  When  using portfolio  weights,  a large trade
in one stock can have substantial effects on the weights of holdings that involve no
transactions.  Our main concem here-as  in the rest of the international-finance-based
5This mean estimate  does not value-weight  the individual stock positions.  This could make a difference  if
the intensity of momentum  trading differs depending  on position value. After calculating  it both ways, we
did not find any qualitative  difference  in the results.
6literature on momentum  trading-is  the relation between  returns and transaction  flows. 6
Accordingly, we want our realizations of MK,,  to reflect actual transactions-the  buying
and selling of winners  and losers.
Separating  Manager  and Investor  Momentum  Trading
An important issue in the context of mutual-fund strategies is the effect of net
redemptions.  Many funds experience  substantial  redemptions  during crisis periods. If, on
average,  funds sell shares to meet redemptions  when Ri,t-k is negative,  then our momentum
trading measures  will be positive.  This result is not spurious.  But it does reflect strategies
of underlying  investors,  rather than strategies  of the fund  manager.
We control for this redemption  effect by measuring  the quantity transacted  in each
stock relative to  a fund-specific benchmark. This benchmark reflects the quantity that
would be transacted  if a fund's  net flows from investors  produced  proportional  adjustment
in all stocks. Specifically,  to isolate the manager's contribution  to momentum  trading we
calculate  individual  observations  of:
Q  _Q  2;~~I(Qi.X.,  -QQ,.t  [)j, p
M.t  =  QiLj,QZt 4 jEi  ]  RJ  (2)
where Pj,,  is the price of security  j at time t, and Pj, is  (Pj,,+Pj,,  )/2. The second term in
brackets is a term that is fund-specific,  i.e., for a given fund i and time t, it is invariant
across stocks  j. It captures the percent increase in portfolio size due to net inflows.  Here,
we use the notation  je i to denote all those stocks  j held by fund i. The overall  momentum
trading  measure in equation (2) therefore  reflects  the degree  to which the manager of fund i
buys winners and sells losers beyond any  average quantity adjustment due to  fund
inflows/outflows.  To  understand why, note that the numerator of the second term in
6This  contrasts  with the asset-pricing-based  literature  on momentum,  whose  main concem  is portfblio
performnance,  in which case  it is necessary  to consider  the return  impact  of all portfolio  positions.  Note
too that  emerging-market  funds  are subject  to large  and  rapid  redemptions  which,  depending  on liquidity
in specific  markets,  can produce  significant  passive  quantity  momentum.
7brackets is the change in portfolio value due to inflows/outflows-using the  P,,  term
factors out capital gains/losses-and  the denominator  is the average portfolio value. (As
with  our  first momentum trading measure  M;j,,,  when  k=O  M',  captures the
contemporaneous  relation between trades and  retums-LOM-and  when k=l  M,j
captures  the lagged response  of trades to retums-LIM).  Under the null hypothesis  of no
momentum  trading  at the manager  level, the mean of the observations  M'j,  is zero.
We can also examine  the investor-level  term in isolation.  That is, we can calculate
individual  observations  of
,ki,j,t  -Qij,it-l  )Pj5
j,f=  ]5  Rj,t.  (3)
Henceforth,  we refer to momentum  trading statistics calculated  from equations (1)-(3) as
whole-fund,  manager-only,  and  investor-only  momentum,  respectively.
A Second  Investor-Level  Measure
Before moving on, it is important  to recognize  what our investor-only  measure is
capturing, and what it is not capturing. What our investor-only  measure does capture is
investor effects on our whole-fund measure; that is, the sum of the investor-only  and
manager-only  measures equals the whole-fund measure. (This is not quite true in our
reported results because we omit some outlier observations  for robustness, as described
below in section  IV.) Though  this investor-only  measure is certainly  an object of interest,  it
does not recognize  that investors' decisions  are made at the level of the fund, not at the
level of individual stocks. (Manager decisions, in contrast, are made at the level of
individual  stocks). To capture this, we also estimate an investor-only  measure at the fund
level. Specifically,  we estimate  the mean of the statistic:
(Q,'  -Q,j,tQ.i.  l)Fj,Rj, t-
M  ji  (4)
mi't  I  U~~~iJ,)it  j,t
jei
8Clearly, this reduces the number  of observations-we lose the stock dimension-but  it
better corresponds  to the decision  that investors  actually  face.
Conditional  Momentum  Trading
In addition to the momentum  measures  LOM  and LiM, we are also interested  in
conditional  momentum  trading. Specifically,  we split our sample into sub-periods:  crisis
and non-crisis.  The crisis portion  of our full sample  (April 1993  to January 1999)  includes
four sub-periods:  December 1994 to June 1995 (Mexico), July 1997 to March 1998
(Asia),  August 1998  to October  1998  (Russia),  and January 1999  (Brazil). 7
Statistical  Inference
Several inference  issues deserve further attention.  First, the percentage quantity
changes-the  term in brackets in  equations (1) through (4)-may  have fund-specific
volatilities.  Two factors could account for differing  volatilities  at the fund level. Factor
one is the considerable  cross-sectional  difference  in fund size-size  can affect trading
strategies.  Factor  two is fund differences  that are distinct  from size, such as turnover  ratios,
redemption  penalties,  and other factors.  Below,  we test for heteroskedasticity  across funds
i, and after finding  it, we correct  for it. 5
While the first inference  issue pertained to heterogeneity  across funds, a second
inference issue pertains to dependence  across observations  within funds. Specifically,
individual  observations  of our various  momentum  trading  statistics,  Mj-,,, are unlikely to be
independent  across stocks  within a given fund. Our mean estimate  should account  for this
7We  also examined  a second conditional  momentum  measure by splitting  our sample into buys and sells
(as in Grinblatt et al. 1995). Buying past winners and seUling  past losers need not be symmetric. We
found, however, that our results were extremely sensitive to the specification of expected returns, an
adjustment that is necessary when splitting buys from sells (see Grinblatt et al., page 1091). We do not
report those results due to their fragility.
8 Because our heteroskedasticity correction affects only standard errors, each observation  of Mij,, gets
equal weight in the calculation of a momentum measure's mean. Our correction for heteroskedasticity
therefore does  not alter  the  fact that  funds with  more observations have more effective weight.
Regrettably,  we have little statistical  power to explore  whether funds differ appreciably  in the intensity of
their momentum  trading. As for heteroskedasticity  in the time-series dimension,  our sample partition into
crisis and non-crisis periods accounts for the most obvious correction.
9cross-stock,  within-fumd  correlation.  Our  estimates  of the mean cluster observations  within
funds, and allow the weights assigned to  individual observations  to  vary with the
covariance  structure.
A third inference  issue  that warrants  attention  is the possibility  that our momentum
trading  measures  might be biased due to high return volatility,  which is clearly  a feature  of
our crisis-ridden  sample (see Forbes and Rigobon 1998).  In fact, we are not exposed  to
this bias under our null, because  under our null the statistics  we report in Tables 1-5 are
equal  to zero. In this case  the bias is not problematic. 9
113. Introduction  to Contagion
The financial crises of the 1990s in Europe, Mexico, Asia, Russia, and Brazil
spread rapidly across countries,  including  countries with diverse market fundamentals. 10
These events spawned a literature  to make sense of the seeming "contagion."  The term
contagion is used quite differently  by different authors, however, so let us be more
specific.  From the outset,  however,  it was clear that authors  use that term quite differently.
Presently, the  literature on  contagion identifies three  types:  fundamental-spillover
contagion, common-cause contagion, and  non-fimdamental  contagion. Fundamental-
spillover  contagion occurs when an inside disturbance  is rapidly transmitted  to multiple,
economically  interdependent  countries.  Common-cause  contagion  occurs  when an outside
disturbance  is rapidly transmitted  to multiple  countries  (e.g., a fall in commodity  prices, or
learning  about common fundamental  factors).  Fundamental  disturbances  underlie both of
these first two types.  The third  type-non-fundamental  contagion-can stem from any kind
9 Under  the alternative hypothesis of non-zero measures,  however, precise statistical comparisons  across
crisis and non-crisis sub-samples would require adjustments for the volatility-specific nature of the
sample  split.  This  type of comparison  is not central  to our paper.  Nevertheless,  we did re-estimate  our
main comparative  results  with a Forbes-Rigobon  correction  (in this case, a correction  to estimated
covariance,  rather  than  correlation),  and  found  no  qualitative  change  in  the  results.
10  Witness  Indonesia in 1997.  Nobody can disagree that there were signs of weakness in the Indonesian
economy at the outset of the Asian crisis: the banking sector was fragile, the economy was not growing,
and there was a current account deficit. Still, these problems were not insurmountable.  Kaminsky (1998),
for example, estimates that the probabilities of crisis in Indonesia by June 1997 amnounted  to only 20
percent. This probability stands in sharp contrast  to the likelihood  of a currency crisis in Thailand, which
skyrocketed to 100 percent at the beginning of 1997. Still, the Indonesian rupiah collapsed only weeks
after the floating  of the Thai baht.
10of disturbance; the  defining characteristic is that the rapid transmission to  multiple
countries  is beyond what is warranted  by fundamentals  (i.e., controlling  for fundamentals
cannot account  for it). This third  type is sometimes  referred  to as pure or true contagion.
Many  authors focus  on  the  first two  types  of  contagion, those  driven by
fundamentals.  For example, Eichengreen,  Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) examine whether
contagion is more prevalent among countries  with either important trade links or similar
market fundamentals.  In the first case,  devaluation  in one country  reduces competitiveness
in partner-countries,  prompting devaluations to  restore competitiveness (fundamental-
spillover contagion).  In the second case, devaluation  acts like a wake-up call: investors
seeing one country  collapsing  learn about  the fragility  of "similar" countries,  and speculate
against those countries' currencies (common-cause  contagion). The Eichengreen et al.
evidence  points in the direction  of trade links rather than similar fundamentals.  Corsetti  et
al. (1998) also claim that trade links drive the strong spillovers during the Asian crisis.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) focus instead on financial-sector  links. In particular, they
examine  the role of common  bank lenders  and the effect of cross-market  hedging  (a type of
conmnon-cause  contagion).  They find that common  lenders  were central  to the spreading  of
the Asian crisis (as they were to the spreading  of the Debt Crisis of the 1980s).
The  non-fundamental  category  of contagion  has attracted  more attention  than  the two
fundamentals-driven  categories.  Theoretical  work on non-fundamental  contagion focuses
on rational  herding.  For example,  in the model of Calvo and Mendoza  (1998), the costs of
gathering  country-specific  information  induce rational investors  to follow the herd. In the
model of  Calvo (1999), uninformed investors replicate selling by  liquidity-squeezed
informed  investors  because the uninformed  mistakenly  (but rationally)  believe these sales
are signaling  worsening  fundamentals.  Kodres and Pritsker (1999) focus on investors  who
engage in cross-market  hedging  of macroeconomic  risks. In that paper, international  market
comovement  can occur  in the absence  of any relevant  information,  and even in the absence
of direct common factors across countries.  For example,  a negative shock to one country
can lead informed  investors  to sell that country's assets and buy assets of another country,
increasing  their exposure  to the idiosyncratic  factor of the second country.  Investors then
-hedge  this new position by selling the assets of a third country, completing  the chain of
contagion  from  the first country  to the third.
11The  literature on  non-fundamental contagion also  has  an  empirical branch.
Kaminsky  and  Schmukler (1999)  find  that  spillover effects  unrelated to  market
fundamentals  are quite common, and spread quickly across countries within a region.
Valdes (1998) examines the degree to  which comovement of  Brady-bond prices is
unexplained  by fundamentals.  Interestingly,  contagion  in his paper is symmetric,  applying
both on the downside during crises and on the upside during periods of rapid capital
inflow.  A different  line of empirical  work  on non-fundamental  contagion  examines  whether
crises are spread by particular investor  groups.  For example,  Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1998)
use transaction  data in the Korean equity market to examine whether foreign investors
destabilize prices. They find evidence of herding by foreign investors before Korea's
economic  crisis in late 1997,  but these effects disappear  during the peak of the crisis, and
there is no evidence of destabilization.  Since their data include only transactions on the
Korean Stock Exchange, these authors cannot examine the transmission  of crisis across
countries.
11.4.  Measuring  Contagion  Trading
Our approach to testing for contagion is different from the literature reviewed
above. Data on individual  portfolios allow us to address contagion in a new way-from
the trading-strategy  perspective. We will use the term contagion trading to mean the
systematic  selling (buying) of stocks in one country  when the stock market falls (rises) in
another."1
To  do this  we introduce a new measure-a  contagion trading measure. Our
contagion trading measure is based on the methodology outlined above for measuring
momentum  trading.  Like the momentum  measures,  we present  contagion  trading  measures  at
three different levels: whole-fund  contagion trading (C), manager-only  contagion  trading
11Notice  that  this  definition  does  not take  account  of the fundamental-versus-non-fundamental  distinction
introduced above. The appendix introduces a  regression-based approach that  allows us  to test  for
contagion with controls for various fundamnental  factors.
12(C), and investor-only contagion trading (C"). These three measures are the sample
averages  of the variables:
CQ  =  (Qt.i 4 - R  (5)
QQj  . Qij.t-I  - rt  JR  (6)
Q i,j  ,t  Qf,jJ-)p-J,t
C,TJ,,  =  jEtQ  J  tPiv  RfJ  (7)
Instead of testing for a relation between quantity changes and own-stock returns, our
contagion  trading  measure  tests for a relation  between  quantity  changes  and foreign-country
equity  returns. In effect, we are testing  for what might be called  "cross-country  momentum
trading."  Here, R* 1 is the return  on the foreign-country  index  f from t-l to t. For each of the
three measures above (C, C', and C"), we  consider five different contagion trading
measures,  each one constructed  from a different  foreign  equity  index.  Those foreign  equity
indexes  include  Brazil, Mexico,  Asia, Russia,  and the U.S. Naturally,  when calculating  the
contagion  trading measure  when f-Brazil, we do not include  observations  where stock  j is
from Brazil (similarly  for Mexico).  Under the null hypothesis  of no contagion  trading,  the
mean of the observations  C  is zero.
Our contagion  trading measure  in equations  (5)-(7) allows us to address many of
the issues we address with our momentum  trading measure. For example, we examine
crisis versus non-crisis sub-samples,  and we partition the crisis sub-sample further to
isolate the effects of particular  crises. We do not offer a contagion-trading  analogue  to
13equation (4}-investor-only at the fund level-only  because the results we shall find for
that measure  are, in the end, similar  to the investor-only  results  from equation  (3)
m.  Data
Our data on mutual-fund  holdings come from two sources.  The first source is the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission  (SEC). Mutual funds are required to report
holdings  to the SEC  twice a year. The second source  is Morningstar.  Morningstar  conducts
surveys  of mutual fund holdings at a higher frequency:  quarterly  surveys are the norm for
most funds.  For our purposes,  quarterly  data are available  from  Momingstar  for about  50%
of the funds we examine. In those instances  where our measure of Mi,  is based on
portfolio  holdings  that are not measured  three  months  apart,  these observations  of AQj,,  are
multiplied by 3/x, where x is the number of months between Qij,t  and Qijt-l.
Our  sample  includes  the holdings  of 13 Latin  America equity  funds  (open-end)  from
April 1993  to January 1999  (24 quarters).  Those funds  are (1) Fidelity Latin America, (2)
Morgan  Stanley  Dean Witter  Institutional  Latin America,  (3) Van Kampen  Latin America
(formerly  Morgan Stanley),  (4) BT Investment  Latin America Equity, (5) TCW Galileo
Latin America Equity, (6) TCW/Dean  Witter  Latin America Growth,  (7) Excelsior Latin
America, (8) Govett  Latin America, (9) Ivy South America, (10) Scudder  Latin America,
(11) T. Rowe Price Latin America,  (12) Merrill  Lynch  Latin America, and (13) Templeton
Latin  America.  Not all of these funds  existed  from the beginning  of our sample;  on average
we have about 10  quarters  of data (out of a possible  24) per fund.
Our third source of data is Bloomberg  and the Intemational  Finance Corporation
(IFC). Bloomberg  provides monthly price series for all equities held by the 13 funds,
including ADRs. (The need for monthly price data arises in our analysis of lag-one
momentum  trading.) These price series are corrected for splits and dividends.  The IFC
provides information  on stock market indexes,  which we need for our contagion  trading
analysis.  Our contagion  trading  analysis  uses the IFC Latin America Stock Market index,
the IFC Asia Stock Market  index,  and several  IFC country  stock market indexes.  The U.S.
equity  return  is the S&P 500 return.  All return  data are expressed  in percent
14IV. Results:  Momentum  and Contagion  Trading
We present our results in four parts. First, we present aggregate  evidence  on the
trades of mutual funds in times of crisis. Then, we present results on within-country
momentum  trading (equations  1-4).  We follow these with cross-country  contagion  trading
results (equations 5-7). In the appendix,  we also present some regression-based  results
relating  momentum  and contagion  trading  with other  determinants  of trading  strategy.
IV.1. Aggregate  Evidence  on our Sample  of Funds  During  Crisis
Though our data set does include individual portfolios, let us first  consider
evidence  based on the aggregation  of those portfolios.  We focus  this aggregate  evidence  on
funds' experience  with investor  inflows  and outflows.  During  the fourth quarter  of 1997-
the peak of the Asian crisis-Latin  American  funds suffered  large outflows (Figure 1).12
The reversal  from inflows  to outflows  during the Asian and Russian crises is more severe
than that during the Mexican  crisis in December 1994.  In the Mexican  crisis, funds  tended
to pull out of Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, all of which are relatively liquid; funds
tended not to  pull out from more illiquid markets, such as Colombia. Moreover, the
Mexico-induced  pullout  was temporary-by the third quarter  of 1995  fund inflows  to Latin
America had resumed (consistent  with the findings of Marcis et al. 1995 and Rea 1996).
Relative  to the Mexican crisis, the Asian and Russian crises of 1997 and 1998 were more
broad-based and persistent. In those crises the retreat from Latin America was more
indiscriminate,  with heavy sales reaching even the most illiquid  markets.  On average,  net
sales in 1998 were about 32 percent. This result differs from that of Froot et al. (1998),
who find little evidence  of net outflows  during the Asian crisis. A possible explanation  is
that the aggregated  data used by Froot et al. include institution  types that counteract  the
clear net selling  by mutual funds (hedge funds?).  Another possible explanation  is that the
Froot el al. data do not include transactions  settled in dollars, euros, or yen, e.g., ADR
12  Net selling in Figure I is calculated  as the change in number of shares-as  a percentage of average
shares held during the quarter-valued  at the beginning-of-quarter  price. The average shares held during
the quarter is the mean of the beginning- and end-of-quarter  holdings.
15trades in New York and dollar denominated  bonds. This is very important in Latin
America.  Our data set includes  all these  trades.
One technique available to managers is using "cash" (e.g., liquid money-market
instruments such as U.S. Treasury bills) to  buffer their portfolios from redernptions.
Holding cash allows managers to meet redemptions  without the need to sell less-liquid
assets. In principle,  this can mute the effect  of investor  outflows  on the underlying  stocks.
However, managers can also reinforce investors' actions if they increase their liquid
positions  in times of investor  retrenchment.  For our whole sample,  funds  kept an average  of
4.4 percent of their net asset value in cash. We then split our sample  into two sub-samples,
one where on average  these funds  received  inflows,  and one where on average  these funds
suffered outflows. In the inflows sub-sample  we find an average cash position of 4.6
percent, whereas in the outflow sample we find an average cash position of 4.3 percent.
Average  cash positions  are remarkably  stable.  Managers' choice of cash position does not
appear  to either mute or reinforce  investor  actions. 1 3
IV.2. Momentum  Trading  Results
In our full sample,  we find strong evidence  of lag-zero momentum  trading at all
three  levels:  whole-fund, manager-only, and  investor-only (Table  1,  column  1).
Interestingly,  contemporaneous  momentum  trading is especially strong during crises. In
terms of attribution,  it is investors  that account  for the lion's share of the contemporaneous
momentum  trading  at the whole-fund  level. Significant  lag-one  momentum  trading  is present
only in the non-crisis  portion of our sample,  and it is concentrated  at the manager level.' 4
For robustness, we estimate each cell based only on observations  of Mi,, within three
standard  deviations  of its mean. This is the reason why, within any column  of Table 1, the
13  A  natural  question  is whether  these cash positions  are stable  because  managers  face some kind  of
constraint.  The reality  is that  funds  are far less  constrained  than  our  cash-holding  results  might  indicate  in
any de jure sense. De facto,  however,  managers  are sensitive  about departing  too much from their
benchmarks.  The classic example  is the hapless manager at Fidelity's Magellan  Fund in the late 90s who
felt that the stock  market was over-valued,  switched  heavily into cash, watched the market rise further, and
was fired for the decision.
14 In our estimation, L1M always relates the transacted  quantities between t-1 and t with the return over
the month preceding t-l.  Increasing the length of the period over which lagged returns are measured
diminishes explanatory  power, in general.
16manager-only  and investor-only  estimates  do not sum to the whole-fund  estimate  exactly.  15
To interpret  the size of the coefficients,  consider  the whole-fund  LOM  estimate  of
2.36. Given the units of our data, an LOM  estimate of 2.5 implies that on average the
product of (AQ,,,,/  Q j,)  and  P,t over a  quarter is 2.5 percent  (a representative  example
would be a return of -10% and a position  reduction  of 0.25, or 2.5%).16
Table 2 presents estimates of our investor-only  measure at the fund level, rather
than at the stock level as in Table 1. Recall  that this fund-level  variant of the investor-only
measure  recognizes  that investors' decisions  are made at the level of the fund, not at the
level of individual  stocks. Despite  fewer observations  from  losing  the stock dimension,  our
results are sharpened  in terms of statistical  significance,  though  the overall  pattern remains
the same. The only notable  change  in the pattem is the significance  of LlM at the investor
leve: it is now significant  at the 1 percent  level, whereas it was insignificant  in Table 1.
Table 3 presents momentum  trading  measures  for three crisis-period  sub-samples:
the Mexican  Crisis (December 1994 to June 1995),  the Asian Crisis (July 1997  to March
1998), and the Russian Crisis (August 1998 to October 1998). The interesting  question
here is whether momentum  trading  is equally strong across different crises. The answer is
no. Within our Latin American sample, we find that positive momentum trading was
strongest  during  the 1994  Mexican  Crisis.
IV.3. Contagion  Trading  Results
Tables 4 and 5 present our contagion trading results. Table 4 presents the all-
sample  results, as well as the crisis versus  non-crisis sub-samples.  Table 5 splits the crisis
sub-sample  further into the Mexican,  Asian, and Russian crises.  In Table 4, we find more
significance  at the investor  level than at the manager  level. Thus, investors  clearly  engage
in contagion  trading, but managers  are less apt. Of the five different  return benchmarks
(Brazil, Mexico, Asia, Russia, and the U.S.),  Russia clearly has  the strongest effects-
15  Using  all observations  tends  to increase  both  point  estimates  and  t-statistics.
16  Returns are measured in percent. The quantity-adjustment  term in momentum  is untransformed (e.g.,
the 0.25  in the  example). Note that the  quantity-adjustment  term uses  the average quantity in the
denominator, so that the position reduction in our parenthetical  example is only approximate. Note too
that our LIM  measures below are  based on monthly returns, not quarterly retums as  in our LOM
measures, so their size is correspondingly  smaller.
17funds are systematically  buying Latin American equities when Russia's returns are high,
and vice versa. This is especially true during the Russian Crisis, which squares with
informal accounts of the extraordinarily  intense contagion at that time. Even during the
Russian  Crisis, however, fund managers  remained  cool-headed:  there is no evidence  they
engaged  in contagion  trading.  The conternporaneous  relation  with U.S. equity  returns is the
only one of the five return  benchmarks  that is concentrated  at the manager  level. It is also
the only significant  effect that is negative.  This negative  LOC statistic for the U.S. return
implies  that fund managers  systematically  buy Latin American  equities  when U.S. returns
are low (controlling  for fund inflows/redemptions).  Though past work has shown clear
links between emerging-market  returns and U.S. interest  rates, this is the first evidence  of
which we are aware  that links actual  portfolio  shifts to U.S. equity  returns.
Table 5 focuses  on contagion  trading during three specific crises:  the Mexican,  the
Asian, and the Russian. The reaction of investors to Russian equity returns during the
Russian crisis was particularly strong: investors systematically sold Latin American
equities  when Russian  equity  returns  were low. Note, though,  that this link to Russia  is not
operative  at the manager level. In the case of the Mexican crisis, the effect is smaller, but
still significant,  and there is some evidence  that managers  were involved  in that case.  In the
case of the Asian crisis, there is no discernable  link to the trading of Latin American
equities.  The last three columns  show the link to U.S. market returns during each of these
three crises. Given  the proximity  to Mexico,  and the importance  of economic  links between
the two countries,  it is not surprising  that the link between Latin-American  portfolios  and
U.S. returns is strongest during the Mexican crisis. Interestingly,  the contagion trading
statistic is negative, and is significant at both the manager and investor levels. This
suggests that, during the Mexican crisis, managers and investors tended to  sell Latin
American equities when U.S. returns were high, and vice versa. One interpretation  is that
strong  U.S. returns in the face of Mexico's crisis bodes well for Mexican equities,  which
induces  a portfolio  shift away from the rest of Latin America.
In closing this section on contagion trading, it is worthwhile  re-emphasizing  the
qualitative  difference  between the results above  and the existing contagion  literature.  The
difference is that we measure quantities, as well as prices, and address their joint
behavior,  whereas  much of the literature  focuses  on correlation  in prices only.
18V. Rationalizing  Momentum  Trading:  Return  Autocorrelation?
In an environment  with positively autocorrelated  returns, momentum  trading is a
natural response. The previous section presented evidence of positive LOM  and, at least
during  non-crisis  periods,  positive  LIM. This raises the question  of whether  returns within
Latin America exhibit positive autocorrelation.  One common way to  test for return
autocorrelation  is using variance ratios. If returns follow a random walk, then return
variance is a linear function of horizon length. That is, the variance of returns over k
periods is k times the variance  of returns over one-period.  If instead  returns are  positively
autocorrelated,  the variance of k-period returns is larger than the sum of one-period
returns-variances  grow faster than linearly. Thus, variance ratios larger than one are
consistent with rational positive momentum trading. Alternatively, when returns are
negatively autocorrelated,  the variance of k-period returns is smaller than k times the
variance of one-period  returns. Variance  ratios smaller than one would call for negative
momentum  (or contrarian)  trading.
Table 6 reports the values of the variance-ratio  test statistic at different  horizons,
together with p-values, for seven Latin American countries. For comparison we also
provide results for the U.S. stock market.1 7 Interestingly,  stock returns in several Latin
American  markets are highly persistent  (variance-ratio  statistics larger than one), even at
three and four-year  horizons.  In contrast,  U.S. returns show no persistence  at any horizon.
Though  certainly  not proof that the positive  momentum  trading  we fmd in Latin  America  is
rational-after all, this persistence  in returns is at the index  level-these  results do point to
the possibility of rationalizing  our momentum  results, at least for some countries  (e.g.,
Mexico,  Chile,  Colombia,  and Venezuela).
It is important  to note, however,  that while  positive autocorrelation  is necessary  for
rationalizing  positive  LIM, it is certainly  not necessary  for rationalizing  positive LOM.  As
noted in Section  11.  1, returns and trades may be truly contemporaneous  if order flow itself
is driving  prices. This is possible where fund transactions  are "large" relative  to liquidity
17 See  Campbell,  Lo,  and  MacKinlay  (1997)  for the asymptotic  distribution  of the  variance-ratio  test.
19in the market (the imperfect substitutability  channel noted in footnote 4), or when fund
managers' trades are perceived  as containing  superior information.
VI. Conclusion
Discriminating  among the various ways that financial markets can spread crisis
requires a sharper picture of actual behavior. Who is doing the trading? What are their
trading  strategies? In  this  paper  we  examine portfolios of  an  important class  of
international investor-US  mutual funds. We address two sets of questions. The first
relates to whether and when these funds engage in momentum trading-systematically
buying winning  stocks and selling  losing  stocks.  We find that international  funds  do engage
in momentum  trading.  Their trading exhibits  positive  momentum,  due to momentum  at two
levels: the fund manager level and the investor  level (through  redemptions/inflows).  Funds
also engage in momentum  trading in both crisis and non-crisis  periods. Contemporaneous
momentum  trading is stronger during crises, and stronger for fund investors  than for fund
managers. Lagged momentum  trading, on the other hand, is stronger during non-crisis
periods, and stronger  for managers.
The second set of questions we address  relates to funds' use of contagion trading
strategies-selling  assets from one country  when asset prices fall in another. We find that
funds do engage in contagion  trading.  Per the appendix,  this result is robust to controlling
for own-stock  returns, the local-market  factor, and the US-market  factor. Strictly speaking,
while  these controls  have a sound  theoretical  basis, they are not sufficient  to conclude  that
this contagion  trading  is non-fundamental  (or pure) contagion  trading.  In any event,  we have
uncovered several stylized facts that are useful for  evaluating hypotheses about the
emerging-market  crises and their transmission.
Beyond  these  stylized  facts,  this  paper  includes  several  methodological
innovations.  For example,  the distinction  between  momentum  trading at the manager and
investor levels is new to the literature, as is our method for distinguishing  the two. Our
method of measuring contagion  trading via transaction  quantities  is also new. Finally, our
regression-based approach to  controlling for  systematic return factors in  measuring
momentum and contagion trading provides a valuable check on the bilateral measures'
robustness.
20An important  question  we have not addressed  is, Who takes the other side of these
momentum  and contagion  trades? Someone  certainly  must. This question  is, unfortunately,
beyond the feasible scope of our analysis.  We can offer some parting thoughts however.
Consider  for example  the following  question:  If the model in our managers' and investors'
heads is one of undershooting  prices, followed  by positively autocorrelated  returns, then
must it be that their counter-parties  believe  the opposite  model?  No, this is not necessary.
The literature in microstructure  finance-which we touch on in section II.1-provides
many models of liquidity providers who do not have opposite models or views, they
simply require compensation  for providing liquidity in the form of transaction costs
(revenues  from their perspective).  It is also appropriate  to keep in mind that, together, the
mutual funds we examine own only about 10 percent of the market capitalization  of the
countries  we consider.  If they were a more substantial  fraction,  then finding  counter-parties
for their trades  would be much more difficult.  Indeed,  the premise  that funds respond  to
contemporaneous  returns  rather  than causing  them  would  be become  rather  tenuous.
21Appendix:  A Regression-Based  Approach
The bivariate relations examined  via equations (1)-(7) draw from, and therefore
allow direct comparison with, past empirical work on momentum trading. But these
bivariate relations provide  no means of testing  joint significance.  Is lag-one momentum
trading still  significant after controlling for  lag-zero momentum trading (i.e., after
controlling  for contemporaneous  price effects)? Is cross-country  contagion trading still
significant  after controlling for own-price effects via lag-zero and lag-one momentum
trading? Are these relations robust to including  local-market  index returns and the US-
market  index  return?
A regression-based  approach provides a natural framework  for addressing these
questions. At the whole-fund level, the questions of the previous paragraph can be
addressed  by estimating:
(QjJ  fQ-QHJ )1 =  + P 1R,  -+  2R-  t-l +  3RLA,t  +  3
4RLM,t +  5Rus,  +£,  ,j,.  (Al)
Here, N.,t  and Rj,t  l are own-stock  returns, as before.  These variables capture lag-zero and
lag-one  momentum  trading,  respectively.  The variable  FqA,,  is the contemporaneous  return
on a Latin  American  equity  index.  18  This variable  captures  cross-country  contagion  trading.
The fourth variable,  Ru6,t,  is the local-market  index  return.  This variable  does not enter the
analysis  introduced  in the previous  sections,  and is intended  here as a control for country-
level systematic factors. The last variable, Rus,t, is the US-market index return. This
variable  also does not enter in the previous  sections,  and is intended  here as a control for
systematic  U.S. factors,  which have well  established  effects  on emerging  equity  markets.
At the nimanager-only  and investor-only  levels, the dependent  variable in equation
(Al) is replaced with:
18 We do not attempt  to remove  the own-country  portion  of the broader  Latin American  index.  Note,
thought,  that  the own-country  index  is also  in the regression,  and our  results  are able  to distinguish  quite
sharply  between  them. In fact, the own-country  index is never significant,  so it is highly  unlikely  the
effects  are confounded.
22(Q 1 Q  __________  X(Q,iJ  - Q'-J  j,t
Manager-only  _  :  )  (A2)
jF;
I(Qijit  -Qij.t-l)Pj.,
Investor-only  :  j  -l  (A3)
jci
This follows  the separation  of the manager-only  and investor-only  levels in our analysis  of
bivariate  momentum  and contagion  trading.
Results
Tables Al-A3 present OLS estimates  of the models in equations (Al), (A2), and
(A3). At the whole-fund level (Table Al), the full sample generates significant  positive
coefficients  on all of the first three variables. Thus, momentum  and contagion  trading are
robust to moving from bivariate  measures  to multivariate  measures,  and including controls
for the overall local and U.S. markets. Interestingly,  the local-market  control is never
significant.  The U.S.-market  control, in contrast, is quite significant,  and negative.  This
squares with past empirical work showing that U.S. investors tend to chase emerging
markets when returns at home are low. When the sample is split into crisis and non-crisis
sub-periods,  we find that contagion  trading is largely  a crisis-period  phenomenon.
Tables  A2  and  A3  present results  for the  manager-only and  investor-only
regressions,  respectively.  At the manager level, we find significant positive momentum
trading (both lag zero and lag one), and significant  contagion  trading with respect to the
U.S. market, but no evidence  of contagion  trading with respect to other Latin American
markets ( 3), except in times of crisis. Our investor-level  results tell a distinctly  different
story. Once we control for the local index return, we find that investors  do not engage in
stock-specific  momentum  trading.  This is not surprising:  one would not expect  investors  to
respond to individual  stocks, but to the market as a whole. They do respond strongly,
however,  to the contemporaneous  local-index  return. And they also respond strongly  within
23the quarter to other Latin American markets per the significant  positive coefficient f3.
Note, though, that  these latter  two effects are concentrated  in the non-crisis  periods.
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2  5Table 1
L_  Iag-O  and  Lag-I Momentum  Trading
All Sample  Non-Crisis  Crisis
Whole-Fund  Momentum
LOM  2.36***  0.98***  5.13***
T-statistic  5.63  3.19  4.55
Observations  4924  3288  1636
LIM  0.20  0.25**  0.11
T-statistic  153  2.35  0.40
Observations  4852  3214  1638
MAnaver-Oly Momentu
LOM  0.868**  0.29  2.01***
T-statistic  2.90  1.27  2.68
Observations  4929  3287  1642
LIM  0.16  0.18**  0.11
T-statistic  1.58  2.11  0.61
Observations  4849  3210  1639
Investor-ngv  Mintentu
LOM  1.70***  0.81***  3.46***
T-statistic  6.12  3.45  4.09
Observations  4954  3292  1662
LIM  0.08  0.05  0.16
T-statistic  1.06  0.75  0.75
Observations  4854  3221  1633
LOM  is the point estimate  for the mean lag-0 momentum trading  measure.  LIM is the point estimate for the mean lag-i momentum
trading  measure  (measured  from return over the previous month).  Whole-Fund  momentum  tests whether  the mean of (AQu/Q  i,j  )P,,-kis
zero,  per equation  (1).  Manager-Only  momentum  controls  for investor  redemption  effects  as in equation (2). Investor-Only  momentum
reflects only investor  redemption effects as in equation (3). All t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity  across flunds.  Full
sample:  quarterly  data from April 1993  to January  1999.  The crisis  portion  of the sarnple  is December  1994-June  1995,  July 1997-March
1998, August 1998-October  1998, and January 1999. The non-crisis portion is the rest of the sample. The total of roughly 4400
observations  is 13  funds  times an average  of about  35 stocks  per fund, times an average  of about 10  quarters  of available  data per fund.
For robustness,  results  in each  cell are based only on observations  within tbree  standard  deviations of the  mean.
*  Statistically  Significant  at the  10-percent  level
*  Statistically  Significant  at the  5-percent  level
**  Statisticaly Significant  at the 1-percent  level
26Table 2
Investor-Only Momentum at the Fund Level
All Sample  Non-Crisis  Crisis
Investor-Only: Fund Le''
LOM  1.99***  0.97***  3.78***
T-statistic  5.49  3.55  4.30
Observations  127  81  46
LIM  0,54**  0.49*  0.63**
T-statistic  2.83  1.79  2.09
Observations  115  72  43
LOM  is the point estimate  for the mean lag-0 momentum  trading measure.  LIM is the point estimate  for the mean lag-I momentum
trading  measure  (measured  from return over the previous  month). Investor-Only:  Fund Level  reflects only investor  redemption  effects
at the fund level as in equation (4). All t-statistics are corrected  for heteroskedasticity  across funds. Full sample:  quarterly  data from
April 1993  to January 1999.  The crisis  portion of the sample  is December  1994-June  1995,  July 1997-March  1998,  August  1998-October
1998,  and January 1999.  The non-crisis portion is the rest of the sample.  The total of roughly 127 observations  is 13 funds times an
average of about  10 quarters  of available  data per fund For robustness,  results in each  cell are based only on observations  within three
standard  deviations  of the mean.
Statistically  Significant  at the 10-percent  level
**  Statistically  Significant  at the 5-percent  level
'#  Statistically  Significant  at the I-percent  level
27Table 3
Momentum Trading Results  by Crisis
Mexican  Criss  Asian Crisis  Rassian Crisis
Whole-Fund  Mometum
LOM  12.11**#  1.69***  8.26**"
T-statistic  3.45  2.97  4.24
Observations  268  920  417
LIM  1.00*  -025  0.22
T-statistic  1.82  -0.69  0.57
Observations  297  898  413
LOM  6.56*  0.99**  1.04
T-statistic  2.16  2.32  0.90
Observations  279  920  412
LIM  1.00***  -0.17  -0.04
T-statistic  2.71  -0.74  -021
Observations  297  898  414
h^n  lyto-oi  Mvments
LOM  7.56**  0.71**  6.86***
T-statistic  2.38  2.30  5.84
Observations  284  921  426
LIM  0.12  0.00  0.64
T-statistic  0.34  -0.02  130
Observations  294  910  398
LOM  is the point estimate  for the mean lag-0 momentum trading  measure. LIM is the point estimate  for the mean lag-I momentum
trading  measure  (measured  from return over the previous month).  Whole-Fund  momentum  tests whether  the mean of (AQqij,  )RA,.,  is
zero,  per equation  (1). Manager-Only  momentum  controls  for investor  redemption  effects  as in equation (2). Investor-Only  momentum
reflects only investor redemption effects as in equation (3). All t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity  across funds. The
Mexican  Crisis  portion  of the sample  is December  1994-June  1995.  The Asian  Crisis  portion of the  sample  is July 1997-March  1998.  The
Russian  Crisis  portion of the sample  is August 1998-October  1998.  For robustness,  results in each cell are based Dnly  on observations
within three standard  deviations  of the mean.
*  Statistically  Significant  at the 10-percent  level
**  Statistically  Significant  at the 5-percent  level
Statisticaly  Significant  at the 1-percent  level
28Table 4
Contagion  Trading  Results
County/Regioua  Index
Brazil  Mexico  Asia  Russia  U.S.
Statistics  All  Non-  Crisis  All  Non-  C(isis  All  Non-  Crisis  Al  Non-  Crisis  Al  Non-  crisis
Swmpic  Crisis  Sanplc  G isis  Samplc  Crisis  Sapkl  Crisis  Sampic  Crisis
Whole Fund
LOC  1.80***  0.63  4.15***  0.83***  0.70  1.10*  0.72**  0.39***  1.38  3.91***  2A8  6.18***  -0.58**'  -0.25  -1.26***
T-statistic  3.45  1.06  3.00  2.56  1.63  1.68  2.23  2.79  1.38  3.05  138  2.73  -2.81  -1.08  -3.08
Man&=r Oni,
LOC  0.09  -0.63  1.52***  0.02  -0.13  032  0.53**  0.12  1.36**  -0.59  -1.26  0.46  -0.50*s*  -0.50+**  4.51***
T-statistic  0.22  -0.99  3.17  0.08  -0.43  0.63  2.21  0.93  2.15  -0.66  -1.05  0.29  -3.61  -2.90  -2.84
Inestor  Onl
LOC  1.89+**  1.69*5*  2.30**  1 .12*  0.92***  1.52*5*  0.62***  0A5***  0.96  5.87**  4.36***  8.28**  -0.02  0.21  -0.48
T-statistic  3.95  3.04  3.64  4.63  3.23  4.09  2.58  3.59  1.34  4.70  2.88  443  -0.09  1.15  -1.27
LOC dcnotcs lag-0 contagion  trading.  Whole-Fund  contagion  tests whether  the mean of (AqI,/  ,)RKis zero, where R,  is the return  on foreign index  f from t-l  tot,  with fe  (Bsazil. Mexico, Asia, Russia,
U.S. },  per equation  (4).  Manager-Only  contagion  controls  for investor  redemption  effects as in equation (5). lnvestor-Only  contagion  reflects  only investor  redemption  effects  as in equation (6). All t-
statistics are corrected  fbrheteroskedasticity  across funds. Full sample:  April  1993 to January  1999.  The crisis portion ofthe  sample  is  December  1994-June 1995. July  1997-March  1998, August  1998-
October  1998, and January  1999. The non-crisis portion is the rest of the sample. Asia  is the IFC Asia Stock Market Index. Note that Braziliani equities  are excluded  from the calculation  of LOC for Brazil
(similarly for Mexico).
*  Statistically Significant  at the 10-percent levdl
*  Statistically Significant  at the 5-percent level
Statistically  Significant  at the I  -pcrcent level
29Table 5
Contagion Trading Results by Individual Crisis
Mexico During  Asia  During  Russia During  U.S. During  U.S. During  U.S. Daring
Mcxican Crisis  Asian Crisis  Russian Crisis  Mcxican Crisis  Asian Crisis  Russian Crisis
Statistic
Whole Fund
L0C  3.899  0.27  22.0"*'  -3.59***  -0.90**  .22
T-statistic  1.88  0.40  3.55  -3.71  -2.23  -0.33
MnA_  .ul
LOC  1.89*  1.66  6.03  -1.73***  -0.41  0.10
T-statistic  1.80  135  1.18  -3.91  -1A8  0.86
in  tr  Oly
LOC  3.23*"  0.42  24.0*"'  -1.86*  -0.17  0.17
T-statistic  2.00  0.47  5.53  -2.44  -0.42  0.30
1~  ~  ~  ~
LOC denotes  lag-0 contagion  trading.  Wholc-Fund  contagion  tests whethcr  the mean of(AQ  Qijt  )Rf,is zero, where Rftis tdreturn  on forcign  imdcx f from t- Ito  t, with fe (Mcxico,  Asia.  Russia,  U.S..  pcr
equation  (4). Manager-Only  contagion  controls  for investor  redemption effects  as  in equation  (5). Investor-Only  contagion  reflects  only investor  redemption  effects  as in  equation (6). All t-statistics  are
corrected  for heteroskedasticity  across funds.  The Mexican  Crisis portion of  the sample  is December  1994-June 1995. The Asian  Crisis portion  of  the sample  is July  1997-March  1998. The Russian Crisis
portion of the samplc  is August  1998-October 1998. Asia is the IFC Asia Stock Market Index. Note  that Mcxican cquities  arc cxcluded from the calculation  of LOC for Mcxico.
*  Slatisticaly  Significant  at the 10-percent level
**  Statistically  Significant  at the 5-percent  level
"'  Statistically Significant  at the  I -percent level
30Table 6: Variance Ratio Test of Stock Returns
Horizon
COUNTRY  3-months  12-months  24-months  36-months  48-months  60-months
Argentina  1.02  0.88  0.70  0.62  0.60  0.60
(0.84)  (0.59)  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.39)  (0.45)
Brazil  1.01  0.99  0.82  0.71  0.75  0.83
(0.93)  (0.95)  (0.57)  (0.46)  (0.59)  (0.75)
Chile  1.34  1.94  2.50  2.88  3.16  2.97
(0.00)  (0.  00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Colombia  1.43  2.22  2.40  2.63  2.76  2.81
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Mexico  1.31  1.50  1.61  1.74  1.85  1.84
(0.00)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.11)
Peru  1.07  0.80  0.64  0.70  0.82  0.58
(0.45)  (0.37)  (0.27)  (0.45)  (0.69)  (0.42)
Venezuela  1.15  1.59  1.53  1.10  0.97  0.88
(0.09)  (0.01)  (0.10)  (0.80)  (0.95)  (0.82)
USA  0.96  0.91  0.83  0.90  0.91  0.94
(0.64)  (0.69)  (0.60)  (0.81)  (0.84)  (0.91)
P-valucs shown in parenthcscs  for the null hypothcsis  that the  variance ratio cquals  1,  where thc nuncrator is the  variancc of k-month  retums and thc denominator  is k timcs thc variancc of 1-month
rcturns. If-returns  follow  a random walk (i.e., no rctum autocorrelation),  thcn  return variance  is a linear function  of horizon lcngth:  thc varianrc of returns overk periods is k times the variance ofreturns
ovcr one-period.  If returns arc positively autocorrclated,  the variance of k-period  rcturns is larger  than thc  sum of onc-period  returns-variances  grow faster than lincarly. Thus, variance  ratios larger than
onc are consistent  with rational  positivc momcntun trading.  Alternatively,  when returns arc  negatively autocorrclated,  the  variancc of k-period  rcturns is smaller than k times thc variancc  of onc-period
returns. Variance  ratios smaller  than onc would call for ncgative  momcntum  (or contrarian)  trading.  Samplc:  monthly  index  returns  from January 1975  to October  1998.
31Table  Al
Regression Results: Whole Fund
(  Q  )J =  a +  PRj,, + flRj,,  + P3RLA,  + /3 4RLM  J + (3 5RUSJ  +  -,  jf
Independent  Variables  All Sample  Non-Crisis  Crisis
Own  Return  (P,)  0.0021***  0.0029***  0.00150*t
T-statistic  5.34  4.04  2.76
Own Return  Lagged  (,&)  0.0029+**  0.00420**  0.0002
T-statistic  3.15  5.501  0.138
Latin  America  Retum  (03)  0.0035*5*  0.0021  0.0041***
T-statistic  3.20  1.49  2.62
Local  Index Return  (0)  0.0000  -0.0003  0.0006
T-statistic  -0.01  -032  0.44
US Return  (a)  -0.0065***  -0.0041w  .0096%**
T-statistic  -6.24  -1.95  4.54
Constant  -0.0048  -0.0086  0.0026
T-statistic  -024  -030  0.05
Observations  4,842  3,223  1,619
Adjusted R-squared  0.05  0.03  0.06
These results are "Whole Fund" in that they include no control  for investor  redemption effects as in equation (7). T-statistics are
contected  for heteroskedasticity  across funds. Full sample:  April 1993  to January 1999.  The crisis portion of the sample is December
1994-June  1995,  July 1997-March  1998,  August 1998-October  1998,  and January 1999.  Thenon-crisis  portion  is the rest of the sample.
For robustness,  results in each  cell are based only on observations  within three standard  deviations  of the mean.
*  Statistically  Significant  at the 10-percent  level
**  Statistically  Significant  at the  5-percent  level
**  Statistically Significant  at the 1-percent level
32Table A2
Regression Results: Manager Only
(Q  _Q  ~~~(Qiij,-  Qi,j,,l  )Tj,,
Ql  iJ,t  JIA  i,l  j  ]  =  - 1 1 Rj,, +  P,Rjtt  +  0 2Rj,t  I
33RLA,t  +  4RLM,t  +  I 5RUs,t  +  i,i,t
ji
Independent  Variabks  AD Sample  Non-Crisis  Crisis
Own Return  (P,)  0.0042***  0.0052***  0.0033***
T-scatistic  5.56  3.76  2.76
Own Return Lagged (N)  0.0049***  0.0071**  0.0004
T-statistic  2.78  4.04  0.17
Latin  America  Return  (N)  0.0014  -0.0001  0.004#**
T-statistic  1.17  -. 44  3.46
Local  Index  Return  (34)  -0.0004  -0.0011  0.0011
T-statistic  -0.328  -0.55  0.48
US Return (Ps)  -0.0115*##  -0.0063**#  -0.0196***
T-statistic  -6.54  -2.90  -7.018
Constant  0.0108  -0.0155  0.0970**
T-statistic  0.326  -0.40  2.53
Observations  4,942  3,274  1,668
Adjusted R-squared  0.03  0.02  0.05
These results are "Manger Only" in that they control  for investor redenption effects as in equation (8). T-statistics are corrected for
heteroskedasticity  across  funds. FuU  sample:  April 1993  to January 1999.  The crisis portion  of the sample  is December  1994-June  1995,
July 1997-March  1998,  August 1998-October  1998,  and January 1999.  The non-crisis portion  is the rest of the sample. For robustness,
results in each  cell are based only on observations  within three standard  deviations of the  mean.
*  Statistically  Significant  at the 10-percent  level
**  Statistically  Significant  at the 5-percent  level
"  Statistically  Significant  at the 1-percent  level
33Table A3
Regression Results: Investor Only
S(QiJ,t - i,j, I [0i
S  Qi,x,tPjJ  =  a-+  ,Rj,,  + 13 2 R 1,-1 +  fi3RLA,+  +  0 4 RL  I+  -fsRus 5 R  + Fejj/
jei
Indendent Variables  Al  Sample  Non-Crisis  Crisis
Own RetLurn  (,)  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001
T-statistic  -0.84  1.13  -OA5
Own Return  Lagged  (,)  0.0007  0.0004  0.0018
T-statistic  1.36  0.76  1.69
Latin  America  Return  (f3)  0.0037**  0.0039***  0.0022*
T-statistic  6.62  4A45  1.66
Local  Index  Retum  s  04)  0.0011"**  0.0012***  0.0005
T-statistic  3.83  5.02  0.94
US Return  (Ps)  -0.0021  -0.0034  0.0013
T-statistic  -1.26  -1A8  0.33
Constant  0.0094  0.0247  -0.0562
T-statistic  0.52  0.94  -1.18
Observations  4790  3241  1549
Adjusted  R-squared  0.29  0.21  0.19
These results  are "Investor Only" in that they reflect only investor  redermption  effects as in equation (9). T-statistics  are corrected  for
heteroskedasticity  across funds.  Full  sample:  April 1993  to January 1999.  The crisis portion  of the sample  is December  1994-June  1995,
July 1997-March  1998,  August 1998-October  1998,  and January 1999.  The non-crisis  portion is the rest of the sample.  For robustness,
results in each cell are based  only on observations  within three standard deviations  of the  mean.
Statistically  Significant  at the 10-percent  level
**  Statistically  Significant  at the  5-percent  level
Statistically  Significant  at the 1-percent  level
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